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Cary Coglianese & Lavi M. Ben Dor 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 The use of artificial intelligence has expanded rapidly in recent years 
across many aspects of the economy. For federal, state, and local governments in 
the United States, interest in artificial intelligence has manifested in the use of a 
series of digital tools, including the occasional deployment of machine learning, to 
aid in the performance of a variety of governmental functions. In this Article, we 
canvass the current uses of such digital tools and machine-learning technologies 
by the judiciary and administrative agencies in the United States. Although we have 
yet to see fully automated decision-making find its way into either adjudication or 
administration, governmental entities at all levels are taking steps that could lead 
to the implementation of automated, machine-learning decision tools in the 
relatively near future. Within the federal and state court systems, for example, 
machine-learning tools have yet to be deployed, but other efforts have put in place 
digital building blocks toward such use. These efforts include the increased 
digitization of court records that algorithms will need to draw upon for data, the 
growth of online dispute resolution inside and outside of the courts, and the 
incorporation of non-learning risk assessment tools as inputs into bail, sentencing, 
and parole decisions. Administrative agencies have proven much more willing than 
courts to use machine-learning algorithms, deploying such algorithmic tools to 
help in the delivery of public services, management of government programs, and 
targeting of enforcement resources. We discuss already emerging concerns about 
the deployment of artificial intelligence and related digital tools to support judicial 
and administrative decision-making. If artificial intelligence is managed 
responsibly to address such concerns, the use of algorithmic tools by governmental 
entities throughout the United States would appear to show much future promise. 
This Article’s canvass  of current uses of algorithmic tools can serve as a 
benchmark against which to gauge future growth in the use of artificial intelligence 
in the public sector. 
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Artificial intelligence has begun to permeate many aspects of U.S. society.1 
In settings as varied as medicine, transportation, financial services, and 
entertainment, digital technologies continue to emerge that rely on machine-
learning algorithms to process vast quantities of data and make highly accurate 
predictions that can often outperform human ability to perform similar tasks.2 As a 
result, the potential utility of artificial intelligence in the legal field has not gone 
unnoticed, with scholars, attorneys, and judges beginning to examine the 
implications it could have for the United States legal system.3 
This Article seeks to capture the state of the art of the current uses of 
digitization, algorithmic tools, and machine learning in domestic governance in the 
United States. It serves, in effect, as a status report on non-military governmental 
use—that is, functions by courts and administrative agencies—of artificial 
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1 While a variety of definitions for the term “artificial intelligence” exist, a helpful one is “[t]he 
theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human 
intelligence.” Artificial Intelligence, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com 
/definition/us/artificial-intelligence (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). The terms “machine learning” and 
“artificial intelligence” are to some extent interchangeable and are used as such throughout this 
Article. Cf. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2019) (“By “artificial intelligence” and “machine learning,” we refer . . . to a broad 
approach to predictive analytics captured under various umbrella terms . . . . For our purposes, we 
need not parse differences in the meaning of these terms, nor will we delve deeply into specific 
techniques within machine learning.”).  
2 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Using Machine Learning to Improve the U.S. Government, REG. REV. 
(Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/08/12/coglianese-using-machine-learning-to-
improve-us-government/; Peter Dizikes, AI, the Law, and Our Future, MIT NEWS OFFICE (Jan. 18, 
2019), http://news.mit.edu/2019/first-ai-policy-congress-0118; Jillian D’Onfro, AI 50: America’s 
Most Promising Artificial Intelligence Companies, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jilliandonfro/2019/09/17/ai-50-americas-most-promising-artificial-
intelligence-companies/#54bfb84c565c; Chris Weller, A California Police Department is Using 
Software to Decide if You’re About to Commit a Crime, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2016), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/intrado-beware-system-tracks-threat-levels-2016-1 (“A new 
piece of software in place at the Fresno Police Department in central California uses huge batches 
of data, ranging from criminal history to Twitter feeds, to assess how likely someone is to commit 
a crime and whether the police ought to keep tabs on them.”). 
3 See, e.g., Daniel L. Chen, Machine Learning and the Rule of Law 4-7 (Working Paper, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3302507 (noting that machine learning may be 
useful in detecting and adjusting for bias in judicial decision-making on asylum requests). 
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intelligence and its building blocks throughout the United States.4 With  
responsibility for domestic governance is divided in a federalist structure across 
fifty-one governments—those of the fifty states plus the national government—the 
scope of our coverage is vast.5 Its subject matter is also a rapidly changing one. As 
new technologies and applications emerge in the private sector, both pressures and 
opportunities for their use in public sector settings will grow. The vast scope and 
fast pace of algorithmic governance makes the kind of stock-taking reflected in this 
paper all the more valuable for informing both scholarship and public deliberation. 
To assess the value artificial intelligence holds as well as identify opportunities for 
its application in domestic governance, it is essential to understand where and how 
it is currently being used. Such a stock-taking can also facilitate future research 
evaluating current applications and making recommendations for the diffusion of 
artificial intelligence in new settings.    
Such stock-taking is also valuable because there currently exists no 
centralized repository of applications of artificial intelligence by courts and 
administrative agencies.6  Given the U.S. federalist structure, the development and 
implementation of this technology is also not determined in any central institution. 
Technology decisions are made at the federal level in as many as several hundreds 
of separate administrative agencies.7 The number of comparable agencies at the 
state and local level surely runs into the tens of thousands, and apparently no one 
has ever tried to count them all. Even with respect simply to law enforcement 
agencies, it has been noted that “the decentralized, fragmented, and local nature of 
law enforcement in the United States makes it challenging to accurately count the 
number of agencies.”8 But, in 2008, approximately 18,000 different police 
 
4 Military and security intelligence-gathering uses would obviously be subject to security 
classification. For the most in-depth treatment of artificial intelligence in U.S. military applications, 
see generally PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF WAR 
(2018). 
5 See generally, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 243 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the 
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001).  
6 One effort to provide such a repository can be found on the Penn Program on Regulation’s website 
on “Optimizing Government.” Uses in Government, PENN LAW: OPTIMIZING GOVERNMENT, 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/ppr/optimizing-government-
project/government.php#municipal (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). Another such project, which 
documents several dozen uses by local and state government agencies, is the Data-Smart City 
Solutions initiative run by Harvard University. A Catalog of Civic Data Use Cases, HARVARD 
KENNEDY SCHOOL: DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Oct. 9, 2019), https://datasmart.ash. 
harvard.edu/news/article/how-can-data-and-analytics-be-used-to-enhance-city-operations-723. 
7 Indeed, just getting a count of the number of federal agencies is difficult. One scholarly report 
published by a governmental agency noted that “there is no authoritative list of government 
agencies. Every list of federal agencies in government publications is different.” DAVID E. LEWIS & 
JENNIFER L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES (2012), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Sourcebook-2012-Final_12-Dec_Online.pdf 
(reporting estimates of the number of federal administrative agencies that range from 252 to 405).  
8 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA 1 (Oct. 
4, 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf. 
 3 
departments and other law enforcement agencies responded to a federally 
sponsored Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies.9  
Similar numbers describe the judiciary in the United States. The federal 
court system comprises, in addition to one Supreme Court, a total of thirteen 
“circuits” in the federal appellate court system and ninety-four trial court “districts” 
(each with dozens of trial judges that in total number over 650 courtrooms).10 At 
the state level, the number of different courts proliferates still further—especially 
given that state governments further delegate domestic authority to county and 
municipal governments. According to the National Center for State Courts, 
approximately 15,000-17,000 different state and municipal courts exist in the 
United States.11  
Any one of these numerous judicial or administrative entities could in 
principle have its own policy with respect to electronic filing, digitization of 
documents, or the use of algorithms to support decision-making.12 As a result, it is 
valuable for decision-makers in any of these settings, as well as scholars and 
practitioners, to have a source to turn to that catalogs current uses of artificial 
intelligence and its building blocks across the United States. Of course, any such 
survey of uses must be made with appropriate caution, as we can make no claim to 
have identified every use by any governmental entity. This Article is based 
primarily on extensive searches of academic literature and media publications in an 
effort to identify current uses of machine-learning algorithms in decision support 
systems used by state and federal courts and agencies. We also spoke with court 
and agency officials who would be in a position to know about the current uses of 
artificial intelligence and its building blocks by governmental entities, as well as 
leading consultants and academic experts developing and studying such possible 
uses. This research effort generated as comprehensive a survey of judicial and 
administrative uses of machine learning across federal and state governments as 
any of which we know.  
The results of our research lead us to be quite confident in two overarching 
conclusions. First, no judicial or administrative body in the United States has 
instituted a system that provides for total decision-making by algorithm, such that 
a digital system makes a fully independent determination (that is, a human “out of 
the loop” decision).13 Second, we are also aware of no court that is currently relying 
 
9 Id. at 6. 
10 See, e.g., Court Role and Structure, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
11 This estimate is based on a telephone and email exchange with NCSC staff, and it includes a vast 
number of municipal courts. Indeed, the uncertainty reflected in the range (rather than a point 
estimate) is apparently due to fairly regular changes in the size and organization of municipal courts.  
12 See, e.g., U.S. SUPREME COURT, RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (adopted Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf; FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a) (“[A] 
district court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may adopt and amend rules governing its 
practice.”); FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1) (“Each court of appeals acting by a majority of its judges in 
regular active service may . . . make and amend rules governing its practice.”). 
13 For a discussion of the difference between using algorithms on a supportive versus determinative 
basis, see Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 1, at 31; Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by 
Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1167-
1170 (2017). 
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in any way, even on a human-in-the-loop basis, on machine-learning algorithms for 
judicial decisions. That said, one state has a parole board using a system based on 
a machine-learning algorithm to support prisoner release decisions, and numerous 
federal and state agencies have deployed or are currently researching the use of 
machine learning in support of various administrative functions.  
Here, we distinguish such machine-learning algorithms—which we treat 
here as defining artificial intelligence— from two building blocks that might help 
lead to the eventual governmental use of artificial intelligence: digitization and 
algorithmic tools. Indeed, machine learning resides on the far end of a spectrum of 
digital technologies available to governments. The closest point on that spectrum 
begins with simple digitization—or the use of electronic filing or other data systems 
to manage information in electronic format. Digitization is a building block toward 
artificial intelligence because it can facilitate the availability of the “Big Data” on 
which machine learning is based. Next on the spectrum would be for governments 
to rely on what we call here algorithmic tools—that is, traditional, human-created 
statistical models, indices, or scoring systems that are then used as decision tools. 
These traditional algorithmic or statistical tools rely on humans to select the specific 
variables to be included in a decision aid and the precise mathematical relationships 
between those variables. Only the final step on the spectrum—machine learning—
constitutes what we will consider artificial intelligence, because learning 
algorithms essentially work “on their own” to process data and discover optimal 
mathematical relationships between them. This autonomous self-discovery is what 
gives machine-learning algorithms not only their name but also their frequent 
superior performance in terms of accuracy over traditional algorithmic tools. Of 
course, even with machine learning, humans must specify the objective that the 
learning algorithm is supposed to forecast or optimize, and humans must undertake 
a number of steps to “train” the algorithm and refine its operation.14 Yet these 
learning algorithms are different than traditional statistical tools because the precise 
ways that data are combined and analyzed are neither determined in advance by a 
human analyst nor easily explainable after the fact. For this reason, machine-
learning algorithms are often described as “black-box” algorithms because they do 
not afford a ready way of characterizing how they work—other than that they can 
be quite accurate in achieving the objectives they have been designed to achieve. 
In the rest of this Article, we first take up the status of artificial intelligence 
in the federal and state judiciaries. More precisely, we report on three building 
blocks that might eventually lead to the use of artificial intelligence in the courts: 
the increased digitization of court records, the use of algorithmic tools for risk 
assessment in aspects of the criminal justice process, and the growth of online 
dispute resolution outside of the courts. The most widespread innovation in the 
courts has occurred in various forms of digitization (such as electronic filing and 
case management), while some courts have relied on algorithmic tools to support 
pretrial, sentencing. or parole decisions. Some courts also recognize a role for 
online dispute resolution systems developed by the private sector.  
 
14 For an excellent primer on machine learning, see David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: 
What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 669 
(2017). 
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We turn in Part II to a review of administrative agencies’ use of artificial 
intelligence. Many administrative systems have been digitized for some time, and 
administrative agencies have also long relied on traditional statistical analysis or 
algorithmic tools. But most relevant to the purposes of this Article, some 
administrative agencies at the local, state, and federal level are also starting to use 
machine learning for certain analytical and decision support purposes. We thus 
devote our attention in Part II to these latter uses of machine learning in the 
administrative context. 
In both Parts of this Article, we also highlight some of the legal issues, and 
at times the litigation and public controversy, that has surrounded certain 
applications of algorithmic tools or machine learning. Given the increased use of 
artificial intelligence in other facets of society, as well as in many other parts of the 
world, the path toward greater governmental reliance on machine learning in the 
United States will likely continue to move forward. At some point in the not-too-
distant future, autonomous decision-making systems based on machine learning 
may well begin to take the place of a government singularly and literally “of the 
people” and “by the people” in the United States.15 
 
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BUILDING BLOCKS IN THE COURTS 
 
 As of today, of course, we know of no machine-learning tool that has been 
adopted in any court in the United States to make an ultimate, fully automated 
determination on a legal or factual question.16 However, several trends in recent 
years have emerged that could signal movement towards the eventual use of such 
automated adjudication via artificial intelligence. To date, the principal building 
blocks of artificial intelligence in the courts comprise the digitization of court 
filings and processes, the introduction of algorithmic tools for certain criminal court 
decisions, and the emergence of online dispute resolution as an alternative to 
traditional court proceedings for small claims. 
 
A. Digitization of Court Records 
 
 Artificial intelligence depends on data.17 Increasingly, court systems in the 
United States have made data more easily accessible through the growing 
 
15 Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery of Gettysburg  (Nov. 19, 
1863). 
16 See Richard C. Kraus, Artificial Intelligence Invades Appellate Practice: The Here, The Near, 
and The Oh My Dear, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/ 
publications/appellate_issues/2019/winter/artificial-intelligence-invades-appellate-practice-the-
here-the-near-and-the-oh-my-dear/ (noting that in the United States, “the more fantastic ideas such 
as using AI to objectively decide cases by analyzing facts and applying law . . . are still figments of 
creative imaginations”). 
17 See Willem Sundblad, Data Is the Foundation for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 
FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/willemsundbladeurope/2018/10/18/data-is-
the-foundation-for-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/#4bd8c64051b4 (“[D]ata is both 
the most underutilized asset of manufacturers and the foundational element that makes AI so 
powerful.”). 
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digitization of court documents.18 This digitization has in large part been internally 
driven by the courts. Courts at both the state and federal level, including the 
Supreme Court itself, have required electronic filing as one of several ways a party 
can submit motions or arguments to a court, or as the only method of doing so.19 In 
addition, virtually every state and the federal government post free forms online 
that can be downloaded and used by litigants.20 Some courts have created 
“dedicated computer kiosks” specifically designed to help litigants who lack legal 
representation.21 In California, for example, an “‘Online Self-Help Center’ offers 
PDFs that can be filled in online and used for evictions, divorces, orders of 
protection, collection matters, small claims, and other issues.”22  
The federal judiciary has instituted a “comprehensive case management 
system” known as the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system 
that allows for convenient filing and organization of court documents, party 
pleadings, and other relevant materials.23 In 2002, Congress directed the federal 
courts to ensure that, with exceptions for certain documents filed under seal, “any 
document that is filed electronically [is also] publicly available online.”24 State and 
local courts have increasingly rolled out various electronic filing (or “e-filing”) 
 
18 See, e.g., Jenni Bergal, Courts Plunge into the Digital Age, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: STATELINE 
(Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/12/8/ 
courts-plunge-into-the-digital-age (noting that the status of courthouses’ digital use “has been 
changing dramatically in many courthouses across the country. States are moving to systems in 
which documents are submitted electronically, file rooms are disappearing and the judicial system 
is going paperless”); Records/Document Management Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Technology/ Records-Document-Management/Resource-
Guide.aspx (last updated Sept. 26, 2018) (“Records and document management are at the core of 
most courts’ business processes. . . . [M]any state courts have implemented electronic court records 
(ECR) and electronic data management systems (EDMS) in an effort to improve court operations 
and manage unruly paperwork.”). 
19 See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 29 (requiring that in addition to filing documents with the Court Clerk, “all 
filers who are represented by counsel must submit documents to the [Supreme] Court’s electronic 
filing system”); 7TH CIR. R. 25 (“All documents must be filed and served electronically.”); E.D. PA. 
LOCAL R. 5.1.2 (“All civil and criminal cases filed in this court are required to be entered into the 
court’s Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) System . . . .”); CA R. CT. 2.253 (empowering state courts 
in California to either permit or require parties to file electronically). 
20Self Representation, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-
Fairness/Self-Representation/State-Links.aspx?cat=Court%20Forms (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
21 BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE 123 (2017). 
22 Id. at 119. Barton and Bibas report that in a single year more than 4 million people visited the 
California self-help portal. They also report successful experiences with other systems for “DIY” 
lawyering, such as a system in New York State. Id. at 119-123. 
23 Case Management/Electronic Case Files, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/cmecf/. Public access 
to PACER data is not free, which has generated some controversy. See, e.g., David Post, Yes, 
PACER Stinks . . .  But Is It Also Overcharging Its Customers?, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01/09/yes-pacer-stinks-but-is-
it-also-overcharging-its-customers/?utm_term=.49cf19383d86. Similar concerns have been 
expressed related to the video recording of judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Jonathan Sherman, End 
the Supreme Court’s Ban on Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/04/24/opinion/open-the-supreme-court-to-cameras.html. 
24 E-Government Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 347, § 205(c)(1), 116 Stat. 2899, 2914. 
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software to replace paper submissions and docketing, many in the past decade.25 In 
Florida alone, individuals filed roughly 23.5 million documents totaling about 110 
million pages from mid-2018 to mid-2019.26 These systems have created massive 
repositories of filings from litigants and judicial decisions and orders, all held in 
centralized databases. 
 In principle, artificial intelligence could take advantage of all of this data. 
At law firms, the increasing use of algorithmic tools, including those involving 
machine-learning algorithms, can be found to support the review of documents 
during the discovery process. This “e-discovery” practice has been shown to have 
a “strong impact” on reducing the need for human labor—plus it has spawned 
services that seek to analyze trends and make legal forecasts.27 In addition, artificial 
intelligence has been used by outside researchers to attempt to predict courts’ 
decisions using data. In a 2017 study, a machine-learning statistical model correctly 
predicted the outcome of 70% of 28,000 U.S. Supreme Court decisions and 72% of 
individual justices’ votes from 1816 to 2015.28 With a growing amount of data 
available from courts at all levels across the country, it is likely that such predictive 
efforts will only improve in quality in the future. In time, it may also be possible 
that artificial intelligence tools will have gained enough “experience” in document 
review to step into the role of the judges and, rather than just predicting their 
behavior, use the large troves of data available in electronic filing systems to help 
in making actual judicial determinations. 
 
B. Risk Assessment Algorithms 
 
 Algorithmic tools have taken root in some court systems as an aid to judicial 
decision-making in criminal cases on questions of bail, sentencing, and parole—
but so far virtually none of these appear to rely on machine-learning algorithms. 
 
25 Electronic Filing, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/ 
Technology/Electronic-Filing/State-Links.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). For examples of state 
court “e-filing” systems, see eCourts, N.J. COURTS, https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/ecourts.html (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2019); Electronic Filing in the Delaware Judiciary, DEL. COURTS, 
https://courts.delaware.gov/efiling/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019); Active Courts, ODYSSEY EFILEGA, 
http://www.odysseyefilega.com/active-courts.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2019); EFILETEXAS, 
https://www.efiletexas.gov/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019); Superior Court Electronic Case Filing, 
N.H. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.courts.state.nh.us/nh-e-court-project/superior-attorneys.htm 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2019)  (noting that e-filing in the New Hampshire Superior Court became 
mandatory in September 2018). 
26 2018-2019 Annual Statistics, FL. COURTS E-FILING PORTAL (June 25, 2019), 
http://archive.flclerks.com/e-Filing_Authority/Resources/2018-
2019_Board_Meetings/June_25_2019_Board_Meeting/Annual_Statistics_2018-2019May.pdf. 
27 See, e.g., Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers: Computers, Lawyers, and the 
Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 515-16 (2017). Various private sector efforts are 
underway to make use of court data for predictive analytic purposes. One major service is Lex 
Machina, https://lexmachina.com/, which is used by law firms.  Another service, Docket Navigator, 
http://brochure.docketnavigator.com/, performs some basic analytics (albeit not with machine 
learning) for intellectual property cases. 
28 See Matthew Hutson, Artificial Intelligence Prevails at Predicting Supreme Court Decisions, 
SCIENCE (May 2, 2017), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/artificial-intelligence-prevails-
predicting-supreme-court-decisions.  
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An algorithmic tool for bail decisions before trial that had originally been 
developed by the Arnold Foundation has been adopted by at least four states 
(Arizona, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Utah) and about a dozen municipal courts, 
largely in major metropolitan areas.29 According to a recent report by two media 
justice advocacy organizations, all but four states have apparently adopted some 
kind of risk assessment tool in sentencing decisions.30 More than half of the states 
use some form of algorithmic tool for purposes of parole decision-making.31 The 
federal government has recently announced an algorithmic tool for parole 
decisions: Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs 
(PATTERN).32 The PATTERN system was developed in response to federal 
legislation calling for the use of risk assessment in federal parole decisions. 
Similarly, some state statutes encourage or require the use of these algorithmic 
tools,33 while others are selected at the discretion of state or local officials.34  
 
29 See ARNOLD VENTURES, PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT FAQS (“PSA 101”) (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/Public-Safety-Assessment-
101_190319_140124.pdf. 
30 National Landscape, MAPPING PRETRIAL INJUSTICE, https://pretrialrisk.com/national-landscape/ 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2020). Just six years ago, it was reported that only twenty states used such 
tools. See Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809 (2014). Federal courts, meanwhile, must consider the 
Sentencing Guidelines, which set out suggested sentence ranges for federal offenses depending on 
a variety of factors—a somewhat crude, if older and non-digital style of algorithm. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); see also Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108-09 (2007) (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory but 
nonetheless should play a “key role” in judges’ considerations). 
31 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN 
ACTUARIAL AGE 77 (2007) (noting twenty-eight states were using an algorithmic risk assessment 
tool for parole decision-making as of 2004). 
32 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
SYSTEM (2019), https://nij.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh171/files/media/document/the-first-step-act-
of-2018-risk-and-needs-assessment-system_1.pdf; see also Brandon Garrett & John Monahan, 
Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing, JUDICATURE, Summer 2019, 
https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/assessing-risk-the-use-of-risk-assessment-in-sentencing/ 
(noting that the FIRST STEP Act “mentions risk no less than 100 times and relies on risk 
assessments to allocate prison programming and prisoner release”). 
33 See, e.g., ALA. STAT. § 12-25-33(6) (2019) (instructing the Alabama Sentencing Commission to 
develop a risk assessment instrument to be “predictive of the relative risk that a felon will become 
a threat to public safety”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007(3)(a) (2019) (“Sentencing judges shall 
consider . . . the results of a defendant’s risk and needs assessment included in the presentence 
investigation . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.114(A) (2019) (allowing for the use of a risk 
assessment tool by a variety of adjudicatory bodies in the criminal justice system); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
22, § 988.18 (2019) (requiring courts to use a risk assessment tool in determining an offender’s 
eligibility for a sentence of community service); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7 (2019) (requiring the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing to adopt a risk assessment tool to “be used as an aide in 
evaluating the relative risk that an offender will reoffend and be a threat to public safety”); W. VA. 
CODE § 62-12-6(a)(2) (2019); see also ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 6-201.01(J)(3) (2016) 
(“For all probation eligible cases, presentence reports shall [] contain case information related to 
criminogenic risk and needs as documented by the standardized risk assessment and other file and 
collateral information.”). 
34 See, e.g., BD. OF DIRS. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF IND., POLICY FOR INDIANA RISK 
ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (Apr. 23, 2010), https://www.in.gov/judiciary/cadp/files/prob-risk-iras-
2012.pdf (last updated Sept. 14, 2012); R.I. DEP’T OF CORRS., LEVEL OF SERVICE INVENTORY-
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As best we can determine, only one jurisdiction (Pennsylvania) has 
implemented any risk assessment tool in criminal justice that is based on machine 
learning.35 Despite somewhat frequent claims to the contrary in the popular 
media,36 the remaining algorithmic tools appear all to be based on standard indices 
or conventional logistic regression models—not machine-learning algorithms.  
For example, one of the more popular non-learning algorithmic tools for 
bail decisions, the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment, considers nine 
factors: the defendant’s age, the current violent offense, pending charges at the time 
of the offense, prior misdemeanor, felony, and violent convictions, prior failure to 
appear in the past two years and prior to the past two years, and prior sentences to 
incarceration. It then weighs these factors in varying proportions to determine 
scores from one to six that predict the defendant’s likelihood of failure to appear in 
court, new criminal activity, and new violent criminal activity, which a court can 
use in determining whether to grant a defendant pretrial release.37  
Another non-learning algorithmic tool, known as the Correctional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), has been adopted by 
several state court systems for pretrial decisions. It involves an extensive 
questionnaire examining issues such as the defendant’s prior criminal history, 
compliance with probation, substance abuse, relationships with others who have 
been arrested or sent to jail, home and work environment, and personality.38 The 
algorithm uses these data points to place the defendant along several “risk scales” 
purporting to predict the defendant’s relative likelihood of pretrial failure 
(including failure to appear and new felony arrest after pretrial release) and 
recidivism.39 Judges deciding whether to approve a defendant for pretrial release or 
 
REVISED: A PORTRAIT OF RIDOC OFFENDERS (Apr. 2011), http://www.doc.ri.gov/administration/ 
planning/docs/LSINewsletterFINAL.pdf. 
35 See Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk Forecasts on Parole Board 
Decisions and Recidivism, 13 J. EXPT. CRIM. 193 (2017). And technically this use in Pennsylvania 
is by an agency, not a court: the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Another state, 
Maryland, has apparently looked into using machine learning for parole, but does not appear to have 
implemented it. 
36 See, e.g., Matt O’Brien & Dake Kang, AI in the Court: When Algorithms Rule on Jail Time, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/ae7b23e20c874800 aa5746b92210 
a2dc. 
37 Risk Factors and Formulas, PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT, https://www.psapretrial.org/about/ 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2019); see also, e.g., N.J. COURTS, PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: NEW JERSEY 
RISK FACTOR DEFINITIONS 1-4 (Dec. 2018), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/ 
psariskfactor.pdf. 
38 See generally NORTHPOINTE INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-
_031915.pdf. While the details of the algorithm are proprietary, investigative journalistic 
organization ProPublica uncovered the version of the questionnaire used in the Wisconsin state court 
system. See Risk Assessment, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103-Sample-Risk-
Assessment-COMPAS-CORE.html. Other states’ courts have adopted COMPAS as well, including 
Florida, Michigan, New Mexico, and Wyoming. See Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/ (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
39 PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE, supra note 38. 
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analyzing the appropriate sentence to set can then take the values reached by these 
algorithms into account in their determinations.40  
A third basic algorithmic tool, LSI-R (Level of Service Inventory-Revised), 
also aims to predict a defendant’s risk of recidivism by weighing a number of 
factors. These factors include criminal history, educational and employment 
background, financial, mental, and familial state, substance abuse, and other 
personal details.41  
In addition to these three examples, some states have also adopted their own 
unique risk assessment algorithms.42 But yet again, simply to be clear, these are not 
artificial intelligence per se: these statistical models develop formulas based off of 
studying large data sets, and then apply those formulas to the inputs they are given 
for each defendant, rather than engaging in fully unguided “learning” to figure out 
what scores to give defendants. 
Despite their increasing use by criminal courts, algorithmic risk assessment 
tools have not avoided scrutiny. Some scholars, lawyers, and concerned citizens 
challenge the lack of transparency behind some of these algorithms, as some of 
them are created by private consultants who claim commercial secrecy protection 
to avoid disclosure.43 The state of Idaho, in fact, passed a law last year that requires 
that all pretrial risk assessment tools be transparent, compelling the builders of these 
tools to make their algorithms’ inputs open to public inspection and allow criminal 
 
40 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-
programs-secret-algorithms.html; O’Brien & Kang, supra note 36; Ellora Thadaney Israni, When 
an Algorithm Helps Send You to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/10/26/opinion/algorithm-compas-sentencing-bias.html (“Use of a computerized risk 
assessment tool somewhere in the criminal justice process is widespread across the United States . 
. . . States trust that even if they cannot themselves unpack proprietary algorithms, computers will 
be less biased than even the most well-meaning humans.”). 
41 For instance, the Rhode Island Department of Corrections has adopted this test. See R.I. DEP’T OF 
CORRS., supra note 34. Courts in other states have also adopted some version of the LSI-R, including 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Oklahoma, and Washington. See Algorithms in the 
Criminal Justice System, supra note 38. 
42 See, e.g., BD. OF DIRS. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF IND., supra note 34; Susan Turner et al., 
Development of the California Static Risk Assessment (CSRA): Recidivism Risk Prediction in the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 5-6 (U.C. Irvine Ctr. for Evidence-Based 
Corrections, Working Paper, Sept. 2013), https://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/12/ 
Development-of-the-CSRA-Recidivism-Risk-Prediction-in-the-CDCR.pdf (listing factors 
considered by the California Static Risk Assessment tool); LA. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LOUISIANA SENTENCING COMMISSION FOR THE 2010 AND 2011 TERMS 
14 (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.lcle.state.la.us/sentencing_commission/2012_biannual_report_ 
lsc_final.pdf (noting that Louisiana utilizes risk assessment tools for “both inmate management and 
programming . . . for persons held in state adult correctional facilities and supervision planning . . . 
for persons under probation or parole supervision provided by the Department”); THE COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., MONTANA COMMISSION ON SENTENCING 41 (Mar. 1-2, 2016), 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Montana_Commission_on_Sentencing_third_meeting.pdf (noting the use 
of the Montana Offender Reentry Risk Assessment). 
43 See, e.g., Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, An Algorithm that Grants Freedom, or Takes it Away, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/technology/predictive-
algorithms-crime.html. 
 11 
defendants to request access to the calculations and data that determine their risk 
assessment scores.44  
Even when the parameters used in the analysis are publicly known, the 
owners of the risk assessment system will often decline to explain how exactly the 
factors that go into assessing an individual’s likelihood of recidivism or pretrial 
misbehavior are weighted.45 As Judge Noel Hillman of the District of New Jersey 
has put it, “[a] predictive recidivism score may emerge oracle-like from an often-
proprietary black box. Many, if not most, defendants . . . will lack the resources, 
time, and technical knowledge to understand, probe, and challenge” the use of these 
tools.46 However, a widely discussed 2016 ProPublica investigation suggested that 
the COMPAS tool systematically found black defendants to be at a higher risk of 
recidivism than similarly situated white defendants,47 raising significant questions 
about the wisdom of integrating algorithms into judicial decision-making.48 A 
recent study from George Mason University, meanwhile, found that the use of an 
algorithmic risk-assessment tool by Virginia state court judges failed to lower 
 
44 IDAHO CODE § 19-1910 (2019). 
45 See, e.g., Noel L. Hillman, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 
AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/ 
judges_journal/2019/winter/the-use-artificial-intelligence-gauging-risk-recidivism/ (“[P]redictive 
technology becomes another witness against the defendant without a concomitant opportunity to 
test the data, assumptions, and even prejudices that underlie the conclusion.”). Some have raised 
concerns about the secrecy that the creators of these risk assessment tools maintain over the inner 
workings of their products: 
No one knows exactly how COMPAS works; its manufacturer refuses to disclose the 
proprietary algorithm. We only know the final risk assessment score it spits out . . . 
Something about this story is fundamentally wrong: Why are we allowing a computer 
program, into which no one in the criminal justice system has any insight, to play a role 
in sending a man to prison? 
Israni, supra note 40; see also Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as 
Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 781,  786 (2019) 
(noting that “government agencies purchasing and using [algorithmic] systems most often have no 
input into—or even knowledge about—their design or how well that design aligns with public goals 
and values” and “know nothing about the ways that the system models the phenomena it seeks to 
predict, the selection and curation of training data, or the use of that data”). 
46 Hillman, supra note 45; cf. Judge Stephanie Domitrovich, Artificial Intelligence Stepping into 
Our Courts: Scientific Reliability Gatekeeping of Risk Assessments, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2020/winter/artificial-
intelligence-stepping-our-courts-scientific-reliability-gatekeeping-risk-assessments/#2 (urging the 
adoption of best practices to validate risk assessment tools and ensure their reliability). 
47 See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing; see also 
Israni, supra note 40; Liptak, supra note 40; Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at 
Predicting Crimes Than Random People, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/equivant-compas-algorithm/550646/. 
48 See, e.g., Cynthia Rudin et al., The Age of Secrecy and Unfairness in Recidivism Prediction 1 
(Duke University, Working Paper, 2019) , https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.00731.pdf (“[W]e show that 
COMPAS does not necessarily depend on race, contradicting ProPublica’s analysis . . . .”); Anne L. 
Washington, How to Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the COMPAS-ProPublica Debate 2-3 
(New York University, Working Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstractid=3357874 (providing an alternative framework for evaluating the integrity of predictive 
algorithms). 
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incarceration or recidivism rates and that racial disparities in sentencing increased 
in the courts that most relied on the tool.49 
To date, the courts have only started to grapple with the legal implications 
of these algorithmic tools. Most prominently, in State v. Loomis, a defendant in 
Wisconsin state court challenged the state’s use of the COMPAS algorithm in 
sentencing him after he plead guilty.50 Loomis’s COMPAS risk scores indicated 
that he had a high risk of recidivism; at sentencing, the court relied in part on the 
fact that he had been “identified, through the COMPAS assessment, as an 
individual who is at high risk to the community.”51  
In a post-conviction challenge to his sentence, Loomis argued that using the 
risk assessment violated his due process rights (1) to be sentenced based upon 
accurate information; (2) to receive an individualized sentence; and (3) to not have 
gendered assessments be used in sentencing.52 The trial court denied the motion, 
holding that it had “used the COMPAS risk assessment to corroborate its findings 
and that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of whether it 
considered the COMPAS risk scores,” and the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
affirmed.53  
The state Supreme Court rejected Loomis’s due process challenges, noting 
that the variables that the COMPAS algorithms used were publicly available and 
that the risk assessment’s outcome was based fully on either the defendant’s 
answers to the questions or on publicly available information about hist criminal 
history.54 As a result, the use of COMPAS complied with due process, since the 
defendant had the “opportunity to verify that the questions and answers listed on 
the report were accurate.”55 The court further held that, although the use of risk 
assessment tools did involve group data, its inclusion among a mix of factors still 
achieved an individualized sentence for the defendant.56 Finally, the inclusion of 
gender in the COMPAS algorithm’s analysis did not violate any due process rights 
absent any proof that the court actually relied on gender as a factor in sentencing, 
since the algorithm simply accounted for differences in recidivism rates between 
men and women.57 
Loomis appealed to the United States Supreme Court.58 The Court invited 
the Solicitor General59 to weigh in, often a sign that the Court recognizes the 
 
49 Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of Humans 
1-6, 36 (Working Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489440. 
50 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
51 Id. at 755. 
52 Id. at 757. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 761. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 764-65. However, this state Supreme Court warned lower courts to be careful given the 
group-based nature of the COMPAS assessment. 
57 Id. at 765-67. 
58 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4204 (June 26, 2017) (No. 
16-6387). 
59 The Solicitor General handles all litigation on behalf of the United States in the U.S. Supreme 
Court. See Office of the Solicitor General, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/osg (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
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significant potential value of the case.60 The Solicitor General’s Office argued that 
the Court should not grant the petition, noting that no division of authority yet 
existed on the validity of the use of these algorithms and asserting that “[t]he issues 
that this petition raises . . . would benefit from further percolation. Most of the 
developments related to the use of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing have 
emerged within the last several years.”61 Ultimately, the Court declined to take up 
the case, leaving the issue unresolved.62 
In another case, Malenchik v. State, the defendant pled guilty to a felony 
and admitted to being a habitual offender.63 On appeal, the defendant challenged 
the use of the results of two risk assessment tests (one of which was the LSI-R) in 
determining his sentence; the tests’ results indicated that he was at high risk of 
recidivism.64 The Indiana Supreme Court emphasized that the sentence had been 
based on factors other than the risk assessments, since the trial court had also relied 
on the defendant’s prior criminal history and refusal to accept responsibility for his 
actions and change his behavior and had not used the algorithm’s output as an 
independent aggravating factor.65 The court noted that such tools are neither 
“intended nor recommended to substitute for the judicial function of determining 
the length of sentence,” but are instead “significant sources of valuable information 
for judicial consideration in deciding whether to suspend all or part of a sentence, 
how to design a probation program for the offender, whether to assign an offender 
to alternative treatment facilities or programs, and other such corollary sentencing 
matters.”66 As a result, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a trial court can 
properly “supplement and enhance” its evaluation of the evidence before it at 
sentencing by considering the results of a risk assessment, which can “provide 
usable information based on extensive penal and sociological research to assist the 
trial judge in crafting individualized sentencing schemes with a maximum potential 
for reformation.”67 
Meanwhile, a third case, State v. Rogers, involved a claim by a convicted 
defendant challenging the lack of the use of a risk assessment tool in his sentencing. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia rejected the claim because the 
 
60 See Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1240 (2017). For discussions of the role of the Solicitor 
General in influencing the Court’s docket and merits decision, see, for example, Ryan C. Black & 
Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. 
RES. Q. 765, 766 (2011) (“[W]e find strong support for SG influence. Justices who completely 
disagree with the SG nevertheless follow her recommendations 35 percent of the time, a number we 
take to be powerful evidence of influence.”); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, 
The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324 
(2010) (“The U.S. Solicitor General, as the U.S. Supreme Court’s premier advocate, has long 
exerted significant influence over both the Court’s case selection decisions and its substantive 
decisions on the merits.”). 
61 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21-22, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 
4204 (June 26, 2017) (No. 16-6387). 
62 See Loomis, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4204, at *1. 
63 928 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ind. 2010). 
64 Id. at 566-67. 
65 Id. at 568. 
66 Id. at 573. 
67 Id. at 573-75. 
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defendant failed to enter a proper objection at the time of initial sentencing. But 
Justice Loughry, in a separate concurring opinion, argued that a risk assessment 
algorithm is “merely a tool that may be used by [trial court] judges during 
sentencing,” a process over which judges have broad discretion and that courts are 
under no obligation to use it.68 
Finally, in a few criminal appeals, defendants have questioned whether 
prosecutors must disclose the results of algorithmic facial recognition or risk 
assessment tools to defense counsel as part of their duty to turn over exculpatory 
evidence under Brady v. Maryland.69 The courts that have handled these cases have 
avoided delving into issues concerning the algorithmic nature of any of the 
particular tools used in those cases, since they concluded either that the tools were 
not actually used in prosecuting the defendant or that the failure to disclose their 
use did not prejudice the defendant.70 
Although it is still early in the judiciary’s assessment of legal issues 
surrounding courts’ use of algorithmic tools, it seems noteworthy that, in all the 
cases decided to date that have actually wrestled with these issues, courts appear to 
have taken pains to emphasize that such tools only serve as one of multiple factors 
that a human judge takes into account in reaching a decision. Perhaps this suggests 
that, as long as humans remain in the loop, whether with standard algorithmic tools 
or even with machine-learning algorithms, courts’ reliance on algorithms will 
continue to win approval.71 
 
C. Online Dispute Resolution 
 
 Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) has arisen in recent years as a tool for 
resolving disagreements among parties using technology, growing in part out of 
prior developments in the field of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). ADR is 
a term that refers to a range of methods such as mediation and arbitration that aim 
to settle disputes without the use of litigation and the court system.72 ODR 
mechanisms first mimicked ADR approaches to conflict resolution before evolving 
 
68 No. 14-0373, 2015 WL 869323, at *2 (W. Va. Jan. 9, 2015); id. at *4–5 (Loughry, J., concurring). 
69 For a discussion of these appeals, see AI NOW INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 REPORT 30 
(2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brady v. Maryland can be found at 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
70 AI NOW INST., supra note 69; see also Lynch v. State, 260 So. 3d 1166, 1169-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2018), review denied, 2019 WL 3249799 (Fla. July 19, 2019). 
71 See, e.g., Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 568 (“[T]he trial court’s sentencing decision was clearly based 
on factors apart from the defendant's LSI-R and SASSI results. . . . The trial judge did not rely on 
either the LSI-R or SASSI as an independent aggravating factor in deciding to impose more than 
the advisory sentence.”). See generally Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional 
and Ethical Challenges, AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (2015); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based 
Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice 
and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585 (2009). 
72 See ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE 33-34 (2017); Online Dispute 
Resolution Moves From E-Commerce to the Courts, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2019/06/04/online-dispute-resolution-
moves-from-e-commerce-to-the-courts [hereinafter Online Dispute Resolution I]; Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_ 
dispute_resolution (last updated June 8, 2017). 
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into their current forms, which harness the advantages of technology to aid their 
mission.73 
 The initial growth of ODR has been largely driven by the private sector.74 
Most notably, eBay and PayPal have developed ODR systems to handle the 
millions of disputes that regularly arise on their platforms from and among users.75 
Realizing that they could not afford to hire enough human mediators to resolve all 
of these disputes or arrange for parties to videoconference with each other, these 
companies leveraged the extensive amounts of data they had collected on consumer 
behavior and usage.76 Their ODR systems aim to prevent or amicably resolve as 
many disputes as possible and to decide the remainder quickly. To do so, they 
generally first diagnose the problem, working directly with the complainant; they 
then move to direct negotiations (aided by technology) and ultimately allow the 
company to decide the case if the parties are not able to amicably resolve matters 
on their own.77 As the success of these systems inspired other firms to develop 
similar and increasingly sophisticated programs, algorithms have become a more 
prominent dispute resolution solution, allowing companies to automate away many 
(if not all) of the steps of decision-making process.78 For example, Amazon has 
developed algorithms that can resolve a consumer complaint about a defective 
product without requiring any human intervention.79 
 Some courts have also begun experimenting with ODR as a mechanism to 
attempt to resolve lawsuits without requiring the use of judicial decision-making. 
Although much of the innovation in this area has occurred in other parts of the 
world, dozens of state and local courts in the United States, including in Michigan, 
Ohio, California, and Utah, have adopted some form of “court ODR” in cases 
involving small claim civil matters, traffic violations, outstanding warrant cases, 
and low-conflict family court cases..80 What counts as an ODR system can vary 
from a simple website that facilitates entering pleas for traffic tickets online to an 
online portal for engaging in asynchronous negotiations. These are not mandatory 
systems in any jurisdiction of which we are aware, but instead they are offered as 
an option to avoid appearing in court. In jurisdictions with these systems, parties 
 
73 See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 72; Online Dispute Resolution I, supra note 72. 
74 See Online Dispute Resolution I, supra note 72. 
75 See BARTON & BIBAS,  supra note 21, at 111 (2017); KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 72, 
at 34-35. 
76 BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 21, at 111; KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 72, at 34-35. 
77 COLIN RULE & AMY J. SCHMITZ, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE 
FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 37 (2017) (“Each stage acted like a filter, with the objective 
being to minimize the flow of cases that made it to the end.”); see also BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 
21, at 111-115; KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 72, at 34-36. We note that Colin Rule 
helpfully describes the stages of an ODR process using the “DNMEA” mnemonic: Diagnosis, 
Negotiation, Mediation, Evaluation, and Appeal. 
78 KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 72, at 46-48. 
79 Id. at 48. 
80 KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 72, at 161-62; Online Dispute Resolution Offers a New 
Way to Access Local Courts, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2019/01/online-dispute-resolution-
offers-a-new-way-to-access-local-courts [hereinafter Online Dispute Resolution II]. 
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are notified of the ODR option via mailings or websites.81 Parties can access the 
ODR system at any time, and with the more interactive systems they can 
communicate and negotiate with each other, obtain legal information and suggested 
resolutions from the system, and easily manage electronic documents—all without 
having to see the inside of a courtroom.82 These systems can usually reach 
resolution in a dispute faster and at lower cost to the parties and are far more 
accessible than traditional court-centered adjudication.83 
 ODR provides an emerging avenue for litigants and courts to engage in 
dispute resolution outside of the presence of a courtroom and absent a human judge. 
Court ODR systems, as well as the private-sector iterations that inspired them, have 
increasingly adopted automated processes and rely on algorithmic tools to aid in 
reaching what some observers characterize as fair and low-cost solutions to the 
parties’ disputes.84 As some researchers have already begun to note, court systems 
could take these algorithms to the next “level” of autonomy by integrating artificial 
intelligence into ODR processes, allowing for increasingly automated forms of 
decision-making.85 
 
II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
 
 Government agencies have long pursued the use of information technology 
to support vital services and programs. Even outside of the military, intelligence-
gathering, and space exploration contexts, computers have been used for decades 
by government agencies to support administration and data management for tasks 
including tax collection and the operation of large national benefits programs such 
as Social Security and Medicare.86 The technologies used by government have 
tended to lag behind those deployed in the private sector. Federal and state agencies 
relied on mainframe computers, for example, long after the personal computer 
revolution hit the private sector in the 1980s, and they continue to remain behind 
the innovation curve to this day.87 Many government computer systems have grown 
 
81 KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 72, at 161-62; Online Dispute Resolution II, supra note 
80. 
82 Online Dispute Resolution II, supra note 80. 
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quite antiquated. As of 2016, auditors could report that three-quarters of annual 
federal spending on computer technology in the United States is devoted to “legacy 
systems” which “are becoming increasingly obsolete” due to “outdated software 
languages and hardware parts that are unsupported.”88 
Still, the internet revolution in the 1990s did prompt state and federal 
government agencies to begin to digitize many of their services and make greater 
use of the worldwide web. Initially, of course, the movement was slow. According 
to one survey, by the year 2000, states had websites containing an average each of 
only about four automated or online governmental services.89 The most popular 
such digitized service at that time: applying for a state government job (which was 
available in 32 states).90 The second most popular was electronic filing of income 
taxes (24 states) and the third most popular was the online renewal of drivers 
licenses (17 states).91 Today, all states have these basic services digitized—and 
many more services as well.  
The federal government adopted the E-Government Act of 2002 “to develop 
and promote electronic Government services and processes” and “[t]o promote use 
of the Internet and other information technologies to provide increased 
opportunities for citizen participation in Government.”92 That law established a 
federal Office of Electronic Government, imposed a duty on all federal agencies to 
make vast quantities of government information available online, and generally to 
accept online submissions of public comments on proposed regulations.93 The 
federal government has since created portals such as Regulations.gov and Data.gov 
to make available online massive amounts of information previously housed in 
paper records or internal government computers.94 
Today, the United States is regarded as among the nations that has made the 
most advanced progress in implementing practices of e-government. According to 
the latest e-government ranking by the United Nations, the United States places 
second among all countries for “online service delivery” (tying with Singapore, and 
just behind Denmark). 95 It also ranks among the top nations for “e-participation.”96 
These rankings suggest that, even if administrative agencies in the United 
States may have been slower out of the starting gate than the private sector in their 
use of information technology, they appear ahead of many counterpart governments 
elsewhere in the world. They have also moved much earlier to digitize their 
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operations and services than has the U.S. court system. In this respect, 
administrative agencies are well along a path that will support greater use of 
machine learning.  
Some agencies have undertaken focused efforts to make data more easily 
accessible for use in machine-learning applications. For example, officials at the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have expressly focused on developing “the 
back-end disciplines of in-memory analytics, big data, and data quality.”97 Staff at 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established a Data Innovation 
Initiative with similar goals.98 Financial regulators have worked to create a 
dedicated “legal entity identifier” to be able to link disparate transactional and other 
data to the corresponding business entities.99 The Environmental Protection Agency 
has built databases that can be used to train algorithms,100 while the Food and Drug 
Administration has tapped into cloud storage capacity to give the agency the ability 
to analyze Big Data.101 
Beyond these data-centered building blocks to artificial intelligence, U.S. 
administrative agencies are generally light years ahead of the U.S. judicial system 
in terms of employing algorithmic tools. After all, algorithmic tools of the statistical 
kind have long been a staple of administrative decision-making, especially when 
these agencies set policies and regulations.102 Some government agencies, such as 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, even have data collection and analysis as 
among their principal responsibilities.103 As a result, it is also not surprising that 
administrative agencies are ahead of the courts in terms of their use of full-fledged 
machine-learning tools, something that the courts have yet to deploy. Admittedly, 
the use of machine learning within administrative agencies is not yet as extensive 
as it is in the private sector, but artificial intelligence is beginning to emerge to 
assist with important administrative functions—even though, again, we know of no 
example where artificial intelligence has fully replaced human decision-making. 
We also know of no comprehensive survey of all uses of machine learning 
by administrative agencies at the state and federal levels. A team of researchers 
from Stanford University and New York University (NYU), however, is currently 
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engaged in a multi-year effort, involving more than two dozen researchers with 
backgrounds in law and computer science, to survey the use of machine learning 
by the federal government and develop a series of case studies.104 Although this 
team has yet to issue a written report, its leaders did share some initial findings both 
via email correspondence and orally at a public meeting of the Administrative 
Conference of the United States in June 2019. The research team has looked 
carefully through a broad range of public sources to find references to possible 
machine-learning uses at about 140 federal agencies, yielding a total of 175 “use 
cases” involving the reliance on algorithms105—the “bulk” of which appear to have 
been “true AI in the modern learning sense as opposed to processed automation and 
conventional statistics.”106 However, these examples were not distributed evenly 
across agencies: the Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, had eleven 
distinct use cases, while about half of the agencies in the study had none.107 
Furthermore, when team members with computer science backgrounds looked 
closely at each use, they could find only about 17 percent that could be ranked as 
having a higher level of sophistication,108 suggesting that there remains “still a fair 
bit of work to be done to close the private/public sector technology gap.”109 Finally, 
the researchers appear not entirely confident that all of their use case actually 
entailed full machine learning systems, as they reported “some degree of puffery 
amongst agencies when they describe the adoption of machine learning and AI 
tools.”110  
It is also not entirely clear, based on what the Stanford-NYU team has 
reported to date, the precise stage of implementation at which all of the use cases 
find themselves. Some of these efforts appear to be prototypes, pilots, or even 
research studies. Still, the Stanford-NYU team’s finding of 175 use cases across the 
federal government at least suggests a plausible upper bound of the current extent 
of uses of machine learning at the federal level. Obviously, still more uses exist at 
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the state and local government level. We cannot purport to chronicle all instances 
of administrative machine learning in this Article, but instead we provide a range 
of examples to convey the variety of uses to which machine learning is being put 
by various agencies throughout the United States.  
It is revealing that, among the use cases the Stanford-NYU team identified, 
the largest proportion (36%) were devoted to enforcement targeting—that is, 
helping identify cases of possible fraud or regulatory violations have human 
auditors or inspectors follow up to investigate.111 We thus first proceed in the next 
section to provide illustrative instances of machine learning used in the context of 
enforcement. We then proceed with examples in government services and program 
administration. Finally, we turn to a discussion of some of the merits, controversies, 
and legal issues surrounding the use of artificial intelligence in the administrative 
setting. Our discussion throughout both sections includes examples of machine 
learning at the federal, state, and local levels of government. 
 
A. Enforcement 
 
 It is a common refrain that administrative agencies have more problems to 
deal with than they have resources to devote to solving them. Perhaps nowhere 
could this be more accurate than in the context of administrative enforcement. 
Agencies have limited number of auditors, inspectors, and other enforcement 
personnel who must oversee a vast number of individuals and businesses to ensure 
their compliance with myriad pages of laws and regulations. The federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for instance, has no more than 
about 2,000 inspectors who oversee more than eight million workplaces employing 
about 130 million workers.112 To deploy these limited oversight resources smartly, 
agencies need to know which businesses or individuals are most likely to require 
oversight. Machine-learning algorithms can provide forecasts of the likelihood of 
violations, thus helping agencies allocate resources and decide which regulated 
entities to target. 
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, began developing in 
2001 machine learning risk tools to integrate data from prior tax records, as well as 
data from other government agencies, to help it predict cases of possible tax fraud 
and prioritize which taxpayers to target for auditing.113 More recently, the IRS 
developed a machine-learning program that uses credit card information and other 
third-party data to forecast the probability of underreporting by businesses.114 The 
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Securities and Exchange Commission similarly uses machine learning and natural 
language processing to identify potential instances of insider trading or “bad apple” 
investment advisers or brokers.115 Meanwhile, the federal agency that oversees 
Medicare relies in part on machine-learning algorithms to help it identify possible 
leads for its fraud investigators to pursue.116 Federal immigration agencies have 
also increasingly relied on automated processes to help in identifying, monitoring, 
and apprehending immigrants who are unlawfully in the United States.117 
A number of state and local law enforcement authorities use algorithmic tools—
some of which appear to be based on machine learning—in deciding where to send 
police patrols. Starting with a widely discussed CompStat initiative in New York City in 
the 1990s (which was not machine-learning based), many police departments across the 
United States have taken a more systematic approach to allocating law enforcement 
resources by using performance metrics and data analysis.118 Today, this “moneyballing” 
effort includes both “place-based” and “person-based” predictive policing tools.119 
Place-based tools help police identify areas of a city that have a greater propensity for 
crime and may merit greater police patrols. For example, at least a dozen or more cities 
using a vendor-developed software called PredPol, which uses a proprietary algorithm 
to identify areas of a city which are more likely to be prone to criminal activity so that 
additional police resources can be allocated to those areas.120 By contrast, the City of Los 
Angeles Police Department uses a Real-Time Analysis Critical Response (RACR) 
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system and the New York City Police Department uses a machine learning tool called 
Patternizr; these tools are person-based: that is, they integrate information, detect patterns 
in crime incidents, and find linkages between incidents in an effort to identify alleged 
perpetrators.121 Meanwhile, dozens of cities, including New York and Milwaukee, are 
using a tool called ShotSpotter that alerts police to the locations of shootings based on 
the sound of gunfire.122 Recent reports indicate that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and a number of state and local law enforcement agencies are using facial recognition 
tools marketed by private-sector firms such as Amazon in an effort to identify criminal 
suspects.123 In May 2019, the city of San Francisco became the first major U.S. city to 
place restrictions on law enforcement’s use of facial recognition and other surveillance 
tools.124 Other cities are considering similar restrictions. 
 
B. Services and Program Administration 
 
Just as police departments in major U.S. cities have deployed machine-
learning tools to assist with law enforcement efforts, cities are also using machine 
learning to support other key government functions.125 The New York City Fire 
Department, for example, follows its police counterparts in using machine-learning 
algorithms to allocate and target its limited number of building inspectors that 
check for compliance with fire-related ordinances.126 In fact, New York City has 
established a central Office of Data Analytics, which works to integrate data from 
across the city and develop “analytics tools to prioritize risk more strategically, 
deliver services more efficiently, enforce laws more effectively and increase 
transparency.”127 Other cities have similarly created special offices or teams 
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devoted to data analysis and prediction.128 Los Angeles has established a formal 
partnership, the Data Science Federation, with local colleges and universities to 
promote “predictive . . . analysis that will help drive data driven decision making 
within the city.”129 The City of Chicago worked with a consortium of university 
partners to create a SmartData Platform which helps facilitate the use of machine 
learning in support of city services.130 
Cities have employed these tools for a variety of purposes. In Chicago, some 
of these services supported by machine-learning tools include health inspections of 
restaurants, with inspectors assigned based on the algorithmic forecasts of the 
establishments posing the greatest risks.131 Both Chicago and Washington, D.C., 
are using machine learning to optimize rodent bait placement throughout their 
cities.132 In Flint, Michigan, following a major fiasco in the management of the 
city’s water supply, officials have benefited from machine-learning predictions to 
identify priorities for replacing pipes contributing to lead contamination.133 In Los 
Angeles, traffic lights operate automatically based on a machine-learning system 
that optimizes for congestion avoidance using data fed by a network of sensors in 
the city’s streets.134 Johnson County in Kansas has used algorithmic determinations 
of risk to determine how to allocate its social service counselors and mental health 
professionals.135 Allegheny County in Pennsylvania has relied on machine learning 
in developing a predictive tool to help screen the many phone referrals made to the 
county’s child protective services hotline for risk of future abuse or neglect and 
help inform decisions about which complaints merit further intervention.136 
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The Data-Smart City Solutions initiative at Harvard University’s John F. 
Kennedy School of Government has cataloged sixty-four uses of data analytics by 
local governments, some but not all involving machine learning.137 Its list includes 
tasks as varied as identifying children who could benefit from mentoring programs, 
prioritizing trees for trimming, and identifying businesses that might be 
underpaying taxes.138 Meanwhile, the Penn Program on Regulation’s Optimizing 
Government project has chronicled other local government efforts either to adopt 
or study the possibility of using machine learning or other predictive analytics tools 
to aid with a wide range of purposes, including the following: early intervention 
academic support for public school students; detection of problems with water 
infrastructure, waste, and pollution; economic blight prevention; crime forecasting 
by police departments and detection of risks to police officers from interactions 
with members of the public; and improvement of city services, public 
transportation, and public health.139  
At the federal level, too, predictive analytic tools including machine 
learning have been put to varied uses. One of the earliest uses of machine learning 
by the federal government actually helped spur innovations in the technique: the 
U.S. Postal Service’s use of artificial intelligence to support automatic handwriting 
detection and mail sorting.140 In addition, scientists at the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration have relied on machine learning for weather 
forecasting.141 Risk analysts at the Environmental Protection Agency have used 
machine learning to forecast the likelihood that certain chemicals are toxic and need 
further study and management.142 The Food and Drug Administration has 
employed machine learning to extract information from adverse event reports about 
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drugs.143 Similarly, the Bureau of Labor Statistics uses machine learning to code 
survey results about workplace injuries.144 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
is exploring how to use machine learning to identify existing literature that may be 
novelty-defeating “prior art” to patent applications.145 The Customs and Border 
Protection uses facial-recognition algorithms to identify people when they arrive in 
the United States from international airplane flights.146 The Social Security 
Administration uses a natural language processing tool based on machine learning 
that helps flag initial decisions adjudicating disability claims for further quality 
review.147 
 
C. Impacts and Issues 
 
 The principal advantages of artificial intelligence in the administrative 
context are similar to those in the private sector: accuracy and efficiency. Machine-
learning algorithms can make more accurate forecasts than can aid in governmental 
decision-making. For example, researchers have shown that if the U.S. EPA were 
to assign its water pollution inspectors using a machine-learning algorithm in 
instead of just identifying facilities at random to inspect, they could improve 
increase the accuracy of finding violations of the Clean Water Act by 600%.148 A 
separate analysis of a machine-learning tool that could identify chemicals likely to 
be toxic showed that it could save the EPA nearly $980,000 for every toxic 
chemical identified.149  
In addition to improving the allocation of scarce administrative resources, 
machine-learning systems may be able eventually help in reducing some of the 
inevitably biases that are found with unaided human judgment.150 For example, in 
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the context of the Social Security Administration’s disability adjudications, some 
research suggests that human decisions reflect racial disparities that tend to disfavor 
claimants of color.151 A study of just a single office within the Social Security 
Administration found vastly disparate rates of benefits awards, with “judge grant 
rates in this single location rang[ing] . . . from less than 10 percent being granted to 
over 90 percent.”152 If machine-learning tools are used as either substitutes for or 
even just complements to human decision-making, they may be able to reduce 
inconsistencies and other foibles that permeate human judgment.  
 On the other hand, the use of machine learning in governmental settings has 
not escaped controversy. If the underlying data contain biases—particularly as 
administrative data can derive from human practices and systems that themselves 
reflect biases and prejudices—then machine learning might simply reify the 
inequities built into the data.153  
For example, concerns have arisen about inherent biases built into facial 
recognition algorithms, given their potential utility for law enforcement 
agencies.154 A recent study by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
ran millions of photographs obtained from government databases through almost 
200 different commercial facial-recognition algorithms.155The study found that 
U.S.-developed algorithms tended to have higher rates of false positives for Asian 
and African American faces than for white ones (by a factor of between 10 and 
100) and more frequent false positives for women than for men.156 
Moreover, if algorithms rely on underlying data that are limited, or if 
algorithms are not designed or tested well, they may lead to a false sense of 
accuracy—perhaps even making decision-making more error-prone. For instance, 
Indiana’s experiment with automating the distribution of public benefits has 
reportedly resulted in widespread inaccuracies that erroneously deprived many 
vulnerable people of much-needed public assistance.157 Furthermore, reliance on 
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large amounts of data gives rise to potential privacy violation and other abuses of 
power by irresponsible or oppressive governmental actors.158 
In the governmental setting, the “black box” character of machine-learning 
algorithms seem to raise particular concerns about transparency and accountability. 
These concerns have driven increased oversight over the use of algorithms in 
governmental decisionmaking.159 The ways that such algorithms optimize 
outcomes and the solutions they support may not be readily apparent to those who 
they affect, which has suggested to some observers that either they be avoided in 
the public sphere or that government officials take extra strides to explain what 
these algorithms do.160 
For example, a school district in Boston worked with researchers at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to use a machine-learning algorithm to help 
redesign student bus schedules in a way that would have saved the district up to 
$15 million in annual expenses and produced schedules that were healthier for 
students, better for the environment, and more equitable for minority students.161 
But the bus schedule’s “overhaul was introduced with insufficient explanation or 
opportunity for citizen interaction with the model,” resulting in a “public pushback 
[that] was strong and swift.”162 The school district eventually dropped the proposed 
scheduling changes. 
In Houston, a school district ended up in court after relying on a complex 
algorithm—albeit not a machine-learning one—to rate teachers’ performance and 
justify the dismissal of teachers who rated poorly.163 The district relied on a private 
consulting firm to develop and run the algorithm, but the firm considered its 
“algorithms and software as trade secrets, refusing to divulge them to either [the 
district] or the teachers themselves.”164 The teachers’ union and several teachers 
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took the district to court, arguing that the algorithm deprived them of procedural 
due process.165 They argued that, without “access to the computer algorithms and 
data necessary to verify the accuracy of their scores,” the district deprived them of 
their constitutional rights. The trial court issued only an interim decision, ruling that 
the procedural due process claim could possibly have merit and the teachers were 
entitled to take their case to a jury. The court held that “without access to . . . 
proprietary information—the value-added equations, computer source codes, 
decision rules, and assumptions—[the teachers’] scores will remain a mysterious 
‘black box,’ impervious to challenge.”166 Although the court recognized that the 
consulting firm may well have been in its rights to keep its algorithms secret, it held 
that a jury could consider whether “a policy of making high stakes employment 
decisions based on secret algorithms [is] incompatible with minimum due 
process.”167 Of course, the preliminary nature of the trial court’s decision cannot 
rule out the possibility that, had the matter gone to a jury, the school officials might 
have been able to put forth additional evidence that could have satisfied the 
teachers’ due process rights while still protecting the firm’s trade secrets.  
Other cases have in recent years have raised due process concerns over 
states’ use of non-learning algorithms in making decisions to reduce individuals’ 
Medicaid benefits. In Idaho, lawyers acting on behalf of developmentally 
challenged adults filed suit against the state over reductions in Medicaid payments 
for long-term institutional services.168 The state relied on a proprietary algorithm 
used in setting individual budgets that were then used in calculating Medicaid 
benefits.169 Idaho initially argued that the methodology used by the non-learning 
algorithm was a “trade secret” and refused to disclose it to the plaintiffs unless they 
signed a confidentiality agreement.170 The court rejected this assertion and the 
parties ultimately stipulated to a preliminary injunction under which Idaho agreed 
to make details about its budget calculation tool available to participants in the 
program upon request.171  
The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was also 
sued over its use of a non-learning algorithm that determined Medicaid recipients’ 
budgets for the care they needed.172 When the algorithmically determined budgets 
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resulted in significantly reduced benefits for the plaintiffs, they filed a class-action 
suit alleging violations of due process and seeking to enjoin the use of the algorithm 
because they had no way of knowing the criteria it relied on to determine their 
budgets and they therefore lacked meaningful opportunities to contest its 
determinations.173 The court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
the algorithm’s use, since the agency failed to disclose the algorithm’s overarching 
methodology, the variables it used, or how it weighted these variables.174 The court 
lifted its injunction after West Virginia developed and made publicly available an 
alternative system which relied on matrices and allowed recipients to contest the 
accuracy of the variables and the overall use of the matrix.175  
It seems clear from the Idaho and West Virginia cases that government 
agencies will be on the thinnest ground when they disclose absolutely nothing about 
the algorithms they use. But both of these cases involved algorithms made up of a 
limited number of fully known variables that had been assigned specific weights.176 
It remains to be seen what courts will demand that states disclose when they rely 
on complex, machine-learning algorithms that are not so intuitively explainable. 
Given that due process calls for balancing,177 it may be that the Houston school 
district case comes the closest to the likely outcome in procedural due process 
challenges to the administrative use of machine-learning algorithms—where the 
ultimate judgment about the due process calculus and the balancing of interests at 
stake will be one for a jury to make.178  
In addition to lawsuits raising procedural due process claims, administrative 
agencies that rely on machine-learning algorithms are likely to face claims of 
algorithmic bias based on federal statutes, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which prevents state and local governments that receive federal financial 
assistance from engaging in practices that have disparate impacts on protected 
classes. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution’s 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments also prevent state and federal governments, 
respectively, from engaging in intentionally discriminatory practices. If agencies 
are not careful, they could certainly use machine-learning tools in ways that offend 
existing principles of constitutional or statutory law.179 However, the responsible 
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use of machine learning can probably be readily accommodated under existing 
principles of U.S. law.180 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Although the day when a judge’s role is fully supplanted by an algorithm is 
surely still far into the future, if it should ever completely come,181 the building 
blocks that could eventually give rise to a world of increased use of artificial 
intelligence by governmental entities have started to manifest themselves in state 
and federal legal systems across the United States. The widespread adoption of risk 
assessment tools in criminal cases in courts at every level of government appears 
to reflect an increasing comfort in allowing algorithms to inform decisions. 
Increasing digitization of court records could potentially provide judicial managers 
with troves of data for artificial intelligence programs that could analyze and 
possibly even facilitate future automated adjudication. The growing adoption of 
online dispute resolution by both the private organizations and the courts could also 
eventually make the public more comfortable with fully computerized and 
automated adjudication. The opportunities for successful application of artificial 
intelligence seem even greater in administrative agencies, and they are already 
starting to rely on machine learning tools to inform enforcement decisions, allocate 
social services, and manage programs.  
Overall, these tools appear to have great promise. As with any tool, of 
course, if they are not used with care, they may give rise to further problems which 
may generate conflict and litigation. Public concerns have already arisen over the 
use of algorithms in predictive policing and in the criminal justice system more 
generally. The few court cases decided to date do not suggest that the judiciary will 
ultimately disapprove of responsibly designed and implemented machine-learning 
tools—and it is certainly beyond the limits of any kind of intelligence, human or 
artificial, to forecast with precision what the future will hold for governmental use 
of machine learning in the United States. Yet with the continued reliance on 
machine learning in other spheres of life, the public acceptability of, if not demand 
for, its use in the governmental sector may only increase.  
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